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Assaf Razin and Joel Slemrod 
The globalization of economic activity over the past three decades is widely 
recognized. Despite recent indications of renewed protectionism, this trend 
is likely to continue. With the integration of international activity has come the 
awareness that countries are linked not only by the cross-border transactions 
of private firms and citizens but also by the cross-border ramifications of their 
governments’ fiscal policies. The tax policy of one country can affect economic 
activity in other countries,  and  in the choice of  tax  policy instruments a 
policymaker must consider its international consequences. 
Examples of the growing awareness of fiscal interdependence abound. The 
rate-reducing, base-broadening U.S. tax reform of  1986 has been followed 
by  similar reforms in many countries. In some cases, such as that of Canada, 
the tax  reform was  clearly hastened by  a  sense of  the  adverse economic 
consequences that would follow from a failure to harmonize to the new U.S. 
system.  In  other  cases,  the  link  may  have  been  as  much  intellectual 
stimulation as economic necessity. 
The move toward European integration in 1992 has also focused attention 
on fiscal issues. Many observers are concerned that, as barriers to trade and 
investment  come  down,  cross-country  differences  in  the  taxation  of 
economic  activity  will  loom  larger  and  cause  inefficient  decisions  and 
self-defeating tax competition among member nations. Initial proposals to 
harmonize European systems of value-added taxes and to impose a uniform 
withholding  tax  rate  on  portfolio  investments  have  not  met  with  much 
success, however. 
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Finally, there is a growing sense that the internationalization  of  financial 
markets  and  the  increased  importance  of  multinational  enterprises  are 
making  it  increasingly  difficult  to  administer  and  enforce  efficient  and 
equitable  income  tax  systems.  Tax  authorities  must  balance,  on  the  one 
hand, their desire to preserve their national revenues and, on the other hand, 
their  unwillingness  to  harm  the  international  competitiveness  of  their 
domestic business interests. Thus there is not only heightened  international 
competition among business but also heightened awareness of the possibili- 
ties and perils of international fiscal competition. 
The  research  presented  in  this  volume  is  an  attempt  to  lay  some 
intellectual  groundwork  for  an  understanding  of  these  issues,  which  are 
destined to command the increasing attention of policymakers in the years to 
come.  It  represents  an  unusual  exercise  in  academia,  because  it  brings 
together people from two branches of economics-taxation  and international 
economic relations. Our hope was that our joint expertise, perspectives, and 
methods  would  be  more  productive  than  our  separate  efforts.  Both 
theoretical  and  empirical papers  are represented.  All  the papers  share the 
common goal of  shedding light on the role of  tax policy in a more highly 
integrated world economy. 
A pervasive  problem  in  international  taxation,  and  one that  makes  the 
subject  so  complicated,  is the  existence  of  overlapping  tax  jurisdictions. 
Every country in the world asserts the right to tax income earned within its 
borders, regardless of the citizenship of the wealthowner or controller of the 
income-earning capital. Many countries, including the largest economies in 
the  world,  also  assert  the  right  to  tax  the  income  of  their  residents, 
individuals and corporations, regardless of where the income is earned (the 
“worldwide”  system of  taxation).  In  order to reduce the  tax  burden  that 
would result from taxation by both host and home countries, those countries 
that  use  the  worldwide  system  of  taxation  generally  allow  taxes  paid  to 
foreign governments to be credited against domestic tax liability, but this is 
subject to various limitations. In addition, a network of bilateral treaties has 
sprung up to coordinate taxation in the case of overlapping jurisdictions. The 
United States is an example of a country that operates a worldwide system of 
taxation and is also party to a number of bilateral tax treaties. Its system of 
taxing foreign-source income has had a great influence on other countries. 
This system, though, has undergone continual change, and the Tax Reform 
Act of  1986 continued the process of  change. 
In the opening chapter of this volume, Hugh J. Ault and David F. Bradford 
describe  the  basic  rules  that  govern  the  U.S.  taxation  of  international 
transactions  and highlight  the changes brought  by  the Tax  Reform  Act of 
1986. The U.S. attempts to tax the worldwide income of  its residents, both 
individuals  and  corporations.  It  does,  however,  differentiate  domestic- 
source and foreign-source income, principally by taxing foreign subsidiaries’ 
foreign-source  income only  on repatriation  of  dividends,  at  which  time a 3  Introduction 
credit for foreign corporate taxes paid in association with these dividends is 
offered. This allows a deferral advantage to foreign-source income. The Tax 
Reform Act lowered the statutory rate of  tax applied to these dividends, but 
also substantially tightened the limitation of  foreign tax credit by  creating 
several additional categories  of  income  (called  ‘‘baskets”)  across  which 
averaging  of  foreign  taxes  is  not  allowed.  It  also  revised  the  rules  for 
allocating expenses between domestic- and foreign-source income, requiring 
a greater allocation of expenses to foreign operations. 
Ault and Bradford go on to explore the economic policies or principles 
that the tax system reflects. They argue that the assignment of  income to a 
geographic  location  is  often  an  ill-defined  concept,  and  therefore  any 
operational  rules  that  do  so  must  be  essentially  arbitrary.  There  are 
competing theoretical frameworks for analysis in the international area that 
lead  to  quite  different  results.  Real-world  phenomena,  they  believe,  are 
inconsistent with  any  single unifying framework.  They  conclude that  the 
most  important task  for policy  analysis is to  try  to  determine with  more 
accuracy exactly what impact the complex system of rules has on the form 
and extent of international activity. That charge is taken up in the remainder 
of  the book. 
Taxation and Multinationals 
Multinationals pose  special problems for taxing authorities because the 
geographic  source  of  income  is  not  easily  determined.  Overlapping  tax 
jurisdictions,  which  generally  employ  different  tax  bases  and  rules,  add 
enormously to the complexity of  tax  compliance and administration. They 
also can create opportunities for multinational companies to play the national 
tax systems against each other to reduce their worldwide tax payments. The 
concern for  tax  minimization can  create  incentives for real  and  financial 
strategies that would, in the absence of taxation, make little sense. 
The next  set of  four papers examines several ways  that  the  tax  system 
affects the decisions of multinational corporations. The first two papers study 
its  impact  on  foreign  direct  investment,  and  the  next  two  examine  two 
aspects of financial behavior that are affected by taxation. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has surged dramatically in recent years. 
FDI into the United States reached $57 billion in 1988, after averaging only 
$4.1 billion in the 1970s and $18.5 billion in the 1980-85  period. Outward 
foreign investment from the United States in 1987 was $45 billion compared 
to  an  average  of  only  $10 billion  in  1977-84.  The  FDI  of  some  other 
countries, particularly Japan, has grown even more rapidly than that of  the 
United States. 
The taxation  system of  the potential host country of  an investment and 
home  country  of  the  multinational  can  affect  the  after-tax  return,  and 
therefore the incentive, for foreign direct investment. Each of the following 4  Assaf Razin /Joel Slemrod 
two papers uses time-series data on FDI flows to assess how important the 
tax effects on FDI to and from the United States have been. 
The paper  by  Joosung  Jun  examines  the  effect  of  U.S.  tax  policy  on 
outward FDI. He delineates the three channels through which domestic tax 
policy can affect firms’ international investment flows. First, tax policy can 
affect the way in which foreign-source income is shared among the firm, the 
home country government,  and the host  country government.  Second, tax 
policy  can  affect  the  relative  net  profitability  of  investments  in  different 
countries. Finally, it can affect the relative cost of raising external funds in 
different countries. 
Using  this  three-channel  framework,  Jun  examines  the  aggregate time- 
series data  on  outward  flows of  FDI  and  concludes  that  U.S.  tax  policy 
toward U.S. domestic investment has had an important effect on outflows of 
direct investment by influencing the relative net rate of return on investment 
located in the United States and investment located in foreign countries. 
The paper  by  Joel  Slemrod  investigates  how  the  U.S.  tax  system,  in 
conjunction with the tax system of  a capital exporting country,  affects the 
flow  of  foreign  direct  investment  into  the  United  States.  First,  using 
aggregate  data,  the  paper  corroborates  earlier  work  suggesting  that  the 
effective U.S. tax rate does influence the amount of FDI financed by transfer 
of  funds from parent  companies,  but not  the amount  financed by  retained 
earnings. Next, it disaggregates FDI by exporting country to see if, as theory 
would suggest, FDI from countries that exempt foreign-source income from 
taxation  is  more  sensitive to U.S.  tax  rates  than  FDI  from countries that 
attempt to tax foreign-source income on a residual basis. The data analysis 
does not show a clear differential responsiveness between these two groups, 
suggesting  either  difficulties  in  accurately  measuring  effective  rates  of 
taxation  or  the  existence  of  financial  strategies  that  render  ineffective 
attempts by the home country to tax foreign-source income. 
Two of the chapters focus on how multinationals adjust their accounting 
and financial policies  in response to the tax  system. Jean-Thomas Bernard 
and Robert J. Weiner present a case study of transfer pricing practices in the 
petroleum  industry.  By  setting  the  price  of  interaffiliate  transactions,  a 
multinational enterprise can affect the allocation of taxable profits among the 
countries in which its subsidiaries operate in order to reduce the worldwide 
tax  burden  of  the  multinational.  Using  data on oil imports  in the  United 
States  from  1973 to  1984, they  find  that  the  prices  set  in  interaffiliate 
transactions  differed  from  the  price  set  by  unaffiliated  parties  (“arm’s 
length”  prices)  for oil  imported  from  some, but  not  all,  countries.  The 
average difference  in price  was  small,  however,  representing  2 percent  or 
less of the value of crude oil imports. Furthermore, the observed differences 
across exporting countries between arm’s length and transfer prices are not 
easily  explained  by  average effective tax  rates in the exporting  countries. 
Their  results  thus  provide  little  support  for  the  claim  that  multinational 5  Introduction 
petroleum companies set their transfer prices to evade taxes. These findings 
may  not  be  readily generalizable to  other  industries, particularly because 
petroleum is  a  relatively homogeneous good  for which  market  prices are 
easily observable, thus facilitating the job of tax authorities in the U.S.  and 
abroad concerned with transfer price manipulation. 
James R. Hines, Jr.,  and R. Glenn Hubbard  investigate how  tax policy 
affects U.  S . multinationals’ policy of repatriating dividends from subsidiar- 
ies  to  the parent company. The  income earned by  foreign subsidiaries is 
subject to U.S. tax  only when dividends are repatriated.  At  that  time the 
taxes deemed  to  have been  paid  to  foreign governments on  the earnings 
behind the dividend payment may be credited against U.S. tax liability. The 
credit that may be taken in any given year is limited to the amount of U.S. 
tax liability on the foreign-source income. This system provides multination- 
als with an incentive to defer dividend repatriations that will incur a net U.S. 
tax  liability and to favor repatriations from firms in high-tax countries for 
which the tax credit will exceed the U.S. tax liability. In order to study the 
quantitative significance of  these incentives, Hines and Hubbard examined 
data collected from tax  returns  for  1984 on  financial flows from  12,041 
foreign subsidiaries to their 453 U.S. parent corporations. They found that, 
although  on  average  dividend  repatriations  composed  39  percent  of 
subsidiaries’ after-foreign-tax profits, most subsidiaries paid no dividends at 
all. The pattern of  repatriations was related to the tax cost, so that  in net 
terms  the  U.S.  government  collected  very  little  revenue  on  the  foreign 
income of  U.S.  multinationals while  at  the  same time  the  tax  system is 
apparently distorting their internal financial transactions. 
The Effect of Taxation on Trade and Capital Flows 
The international ramifications of  tax policy go far beyond the impact on 
multinationals’ behavior. The tax policy of  one country can “spill  over”  to 
other countries’ economies thereby affecting trade patterns, the volume of 
saving and investment, and the desired portfolios of  wealthholders. Each of 
the next set of  three papers addresses one aspect of how tax policy in one 
country can affect the cross-border flow of  goods and claims to assets. 
Jacob A. Frenkel, Assaf Razin, and Steve Symansky deal directly with the 
international spillovers of  taxes in a stylized two-country model. Adopting 
the  saving-investment balance  approach  to  the  analysis  of  international 
economic interdependence, they emphasize dynamic effects of domestic tax 
restructurings on interest rates, investment, employment, consumption, and 
the  current  account position.  They  show  that  a  domestic budget  deficit, 
under a consumption tax system, raises the world rate of interest and crowds 
out  domestic  and  foreign  investment.  It  also  lowers the  growth  rates  of 
domestic  consumption  while  raising  those  of  foreign  consumption.  In 
contrast, under an income tax  system,  the  same budget  deficit lowers the 6  Assaf Razin I Joel Slemrod 
world  rate  of  interest,  reduces  the  growth  rates  of  domestic  and  foreign 
consumption, and crowds out domestic investment while crowding in foreign 
investment.  The  analysis  of  revenue-neutral  tax  conversions  in  a  single 
country and revenue-neutral tax conversions in the context of a two-country 
VAT  harmonization  reform  (as  planned  for  the  European  Community  in 
1992) highlights the crucial role played by  trade imbalances resulting from 
intercountry differences in saving and investment propensities.  Existence of 
such international differences  implies that tax  harmonization  may  result  in 
output  and  employment  expansion  in  some  countries  and  contraction  in 
others, thereby generating conflicting interests among the various countries. 
The  analytical  results  are  supplemented  by  detailed  dynamic  simulations 
which highlight the variety of mechanisms through which the effects of tax 
policies spill over to the rest of the world. 
Martin Feldstein  and Paul Krugman scrutinize the view,  common among 
many  businesspersons,  that  reliance  on the  VAT  aids a country’s  interna- 
tional competitiveness since such a tax is levied on imports but rebated on 
exports. They claim that in practice VATS are selective and fall more heavily 
on internationally traded goods than on nontraded goods and services. In this 
case, use  of  a  VAT  causes  a  substitution  of  nontraded  goods and  services 
which  reduces  both  exports and  imports, but  the  trade  balance  can either 
improve or worsen.  The only pro-competitive  aspect of a VAT  may  be the 
fact that substituting a consumption tax for an income tax encourages saving 
which, by itself, tends to improve the trade balance in the short run. 
A.  Lans  Bovenberg,  Krister  Anderson,  Kenji  Aramaki,  and  Sheetal 
Chand deal with the effects of the tax treatment of investment and savings on 
international capital flows. They evaluate changes in tax wedges on savings 
and investment in the U.S.  and Japan  and  examine how recent reforms of 
capital income taxation created incentives for bilateral capital flows between 
these countries during the  1980s. The results reveal that the tax burden on 
assets located in Japan exceeded the tax burden on assets located in the U.S., 
while a U.S. saver faced a heavier tax burden than a Japanese saver for assets 
located in  both  countries.  They  suggest that  these  differential  tax  burdens 
could to some extent  explain  the  pattern  of  bilateral  flows of  savings  and 
investment between the U.S. and Japan in the  1980s. 
Some Implications For Optimal Tax Policy 
Much of the research reported here has suggested that taxation can exert a 
potentially  powerful  influence  on  both  real  and  financial  decisions  about 
cross-border movements of capital and goods. At the same time, it is clear that 
the increasing internationalization of  economic affairs has profoundly changed 
what is appropriate tax policy. The last set of papers in this volume explore the 
implications for optimal tax design of  several aspects of openness. 7  Introduction 
Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka address two policy issues in the context of 
world capital market integration: (a) the effects of relaxing restrictions on the 
international flow of  capital on the fiscal branch of government and (b) the 
degree of  international tax  coordination needed  to  ensure  a viable equil- 
ibrium in the presence of international tax-arbitrage opportunities. 
First, Razin and Sadka show that notwithstanding the use of distortionary 
taxes as part  of  the optimal program,  it requires an efficient allocation of 
investment between home and foreign uses so that the marginal product of 
capital is equated across countries. Consequently, capital-market liberaliza- 
tion  tends  to  lower  the  cost  of  public  funds  and  increase  the  optimal 
provision  of  public goods and services. More public  goods are demanded 
because of  the increase in real income resulting from the improved trade 
opportunities and because broadening the tax base lowers the marginal cost 
of  public  funds through  a distortion-reducing change in the  marginal  tax 
rates. 
Second, they remind us that a complete integration of the capital markets 
between two countries requires that  the residents of  each country face the 
same  net-of-tax  rate  of  return  on  foreign  and  domestic  investments. 
Otherwise,  there  must  exist  profitable  arbitrage  opportunities.  These 
conditions will be met only if taxes by  the home country levied on domestic 
residents on their domestic-source income and foreign-source income, and 
taxes on nonresidents’ income in the home country are related to the cor- 
responding  foreign  country  taxes  in  a  specific  way.  To  assure  such  a 
relationship without arbitrage opportunities, the countries must coordinate to 
some degree their domestic and foreign tax structures. 
The net effect of  a country’s tax system on international trade and factor 
flows is only partly revealed by  how it taxes international transactions. As 
Roger  H.  Gordon  and  James  Levinsohn  point  out,  what  are  ostensibly 
“domestic”  taxes can have  an  important  impact on  international transac- 
tions. They study the optimal coordination between domestic taxation and 
both tariff and nontariff  trade policies. When the set of  tax instruments is 
restricted,  perhaps  owing  to  administrative cost  considerations,  then  tax 
policies that distort trade patterns may be optimal, although the direction of 
trade loss may be of  either sign. 
Gordon and Levinsohn next investigate to what extent the observed use of 
border distortions (tariffs, export subsidies, etc.) may result from a country’s 
attempt to offset the trade distortions created by their domestic tax structure. 
To  examine  this  hypothesis,  they  look  at  International  Monetary  Fund 
financial statistics for thirty countries during the period  1970-87.  The data 
suggest that,  while for poorer countries border taxes do seem to offset the 
trade  impact  of  domestic  taxes,  the  richer  countries  have  significant 
trade-discouraging distortions caused by domestic taxation that are not offset 
by  border taxation. 8  Assaf Razin /Joel Slemrod 
The final chapter, by  John Douglas Wilson,  deals with the optimal tax 
structure for an open economy in which similar types of  workers are paid 
different wages since worker productivity in some industries depends on the 
level of wages (the efficiency wage model). The first-best optimal policy, an 
industrial policy which subsidizes high-wage firms, is not obtainable either 
due to  asymmetric information between  the  government and  the firms or 
because employment subsidies lead to increased efficiency at the cost of  a 
less equitable income distribution.  Consequently, a  second-best policy  of 
capital-market intervention is desirable. A role for capital-market interven- 
tion as a second-best policy emerges only when  there exist capital-market 
asymmetries.  A  somewhat surprising result of  the  analysis is  that  if  the 
government  does  not  know  the  identity  of  firms  in  which  supervision 
problems  lead  to  the  dependence  of  labor  productivity  on  wages,  then 
high-wage firms should face a positive tax  on  capital at the margin while 
low-wage firms should face a positive subsidy. In this way  the optimal tax 
policy encourages capital investment in the sector that  lacks a supervision 
problem,  the  low-wage  sector.  This  form  of  capital-market  intervention 
enables the  government to  make greater use of  employment subsidies for 
high-wage firms, because it discourages low-wage firms from masquerading 
as high-wage firms in an attempt to obtain these subsidies. 
Conclusion 
A major challenge to policymakers faced with  a more integrated world 
economy lies in the area of  taxation.  In  fact,  the  international effects of 
taxation are now attracting increased interest in both professional circles and 
governments. This volume provides a first attempt to deal with the complex 
issues associated with the taxation of internationally mobile goods, services, 
and  factors of  production.  We  hope  that  the  book  will  stimulate further 
intensive  research  in  this  important  new  area,  international  taxation 
economics. 